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This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Meroni doctrine in the light of the recent 
judgment in the ESMA case. The first part explains in detail the problem of delegation of 
powers in the EU from the perspective of the principal-agent theory and complements it 
with the analysis of the trade-off between different levels of independence and 
accountability of agencies. A simple economic model is developed to illustrated the 
relationship between the independence and accountability of an agency. It shows that it is 
the accountability mechanism that induces the agent to act, rather than the extent of his 
independence. The paper also explains the inter-temporal interactions between the 
principal and the agent on the basis of the incentives in place for the different players. 
 
The second part is devoted to analysis of the functioning of ESMA in the context of its 
delegated powers. After the presentation of main aspects of the regulatory framework 
establishing ESMA, the paper continuous with an analysis and interpretation of the 
discretionary powers of ESMA. The rather rigid position of the Court of Justice in relation to 
the Meroni doctrine seems to be unsuitable to delegation of complex regulatory tasks. This 
is particularly evident in the case of financial markets. Finally, the judgment does not 
examine in any detail whether and how the principals - i.e. the EU and Member States - are 
best able to evaluate the quality of ESMA decisions and regulations and whether there are 






The purpose of this paper is twofold. It considers the complexity of the act of delegating 
tasks and, on the basis of the lessons it draws, it reviews the recent judgment of the Court 
of Justice in the case brought by the UK against the European Parliament and the Council of 
the EU. The UK sought partial annulment of a regulation that had conferred powers to the 
European Securities and Markets Authority [ESMA] to control “short selling”. 
 
The Court ruled that the powers of ESMA were sufficiently delineated and therefore ESMA 
did not have a large margin of discretion to conduct autonomous policy. The relevant ESMA 
regulation was, therefore, compliant with the so-called “Meroni” doctrine. 
 
In order to assess whether the judgment covered all the relevant issues, this paper 
examines first the nature of relations between principals and agents, why principals may 
want to delegate tasks and how they may curtail the discretion of agents. It argues that in 
situations such as those concerning the regulation of financial markets, a principal has 
conflicting objectives. On the one hand, he wants to control the agent while, on the other, 
he wants to allow the agent enough room for manoeuvre to decide on issues which cannot 
be sufficiently specified ex ante.  
 
The paper also explores the trade-off between independence and accountability. It 
concludes that the Court of Justice appeared not to recognise this trade-off, or appreciate 
its impact on the quality of the regulation adopted by an agency and the usefulness of 
allowing adequate discretion or independence to the agency in order to achieve what 
cannot be achieved by its principal, which in this case is the EU. The paper concludes that 




The problem of delegation 
 
The delegation of tasks by a principal to an agent has to solve two problems: i) the definition 
of the objective that the agent should achieve on behalf of the principal and/or ii) the 
definition of the process through which the agent should achieve whatever objective is set 
by the principal. This is because by defining the process, in addition to the objective, the 
principal deprives the agent from the excuse that the principal has set an objective that 
cannot be realistically achieved. This is especially true when the objective is dependent on 
the process. A case in point is the enforcement of anti-trust rules. Since the mid-1990s when 
the European Commission adopted a leniency policy, whereby undertakings providing 
information on cartels are themselves exempt from fines, most if not all cartels prosecuted 
by the Commission have been uncovered after information from whistle-blowers. The 
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reform of the process of gathering information and the new procedural instruments 
available to the Commission have had a significant impact on its ability to enforce the anti-
cartel prohibition. 
 
In other situations, however, the definition of the objective or the process is sufficient [e.g. 
asking someone to mow a lawn (setting the objective while leaving the process undefined)]. 
In yet other situations, only the process can be defined instead of the objective. For 
example, when carrying out research, it is the procedure that is normally defined rather 
than the outcome of the research [which, by definition, is unknown]. 
 
In order to appreciate the problem of meaningful delegation of tasks it is instructive to 
begin with an example where it is possible to define both what needs to be achieved and 
how it can be achieved. In the Official Journal of the European Union of 5 February 2010 [L 
34] there is a 10-page description of how to make “pizza napoletana”. Commission 
Regulation 97/2010 defines the ingredients, how they should be mixed to make the dough, 
how to knead the dough and prepare the basis of the pizza, what toppings to put and how 
to put them and then how to bake the pizza. It leaves very little to individual discretion. This 
is because the objective is to make pizzas that conform to a particular standard so that they 
look and taste identically. 
 
The task of making identical pizzas appears to be feasible because it has been performed 
many times and the effects of even small variations in inputs [e.g. ingredients, working and 
shaping the dough] on outputs [pizzas] have been studied and documented extensively. 
There is also a pretty clear understanding of what the output should look like. For example, 
pizza napoletana is described as “a round product baked in the oven with a variable 
diameter not exceeding 35 cm and a raised rim and the central part is garnished. The central 
part is 0,4 cm thick, with a tolerance of ± 10 %, and the rim is 1-2 cm thick. The overall pizza 
must be tender, elastic and easily foldable into four.” To repeat, both inputs [or process] 
and outputs [or objectives] are well-defined.1 Yet, it takes the Commission about 4,000 
words to describe how to make the pizza so that it comes out the way it is supposed to. 
 
Now consider the task of preventing persons or institutions from short selling instruments 
whenever that sale would create financial advantages from holding instruments other than 
those which are sold short. This is, in a nutshell, Article 28 of Regulation 236/2012 on short 
selling. This Article defines the intervention powers, in exceptional circumstances, of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority [ESMA]. Short selling is the sale of shares, which 
are not actually owned by the seller, in the hope that their price will eventually decline so 
that they can be bought back at a lower price. 
 
                                                          
1 In general we refer to inputs and processes, on the one hand, and outputs and objectives, on the other, as 
interchangeable concepts, unless it is necessary to differentiate them. 
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The tasks of ESMA are different from the “pizza tasks” in two important respects. First, it is 
not a priori clear what exactly must be prohibited on an ex ante basis [this can be 
considered to be the “input” side] and, second, in case certain things are prohibited, it is not 
sure whether their effect will be the desired ex post outcome [this can be considered to be 
the “output” side], given that a precise description of the desired outcome is difficult to 
define unambiguously. The desired outcome is financial stability but this is not something 
that exists on its own. It is a composite concept that depends on many other conditions 
being in the right state. The problem is that we are not sure about the causal relationships 
between inputs and outputs, whether there are any critical values or thresholds or whether 
the outputs can be described exhaustively. 
 
There are other factors at play that add to the complexity of ESMA’s tasks, two of which are 
the following. First, the ingredients that go into pizza napoletana do not “react” to the fact 
that they are prescribed in the relevant Commission regulation. By contrast, financial 
operators may attempt to evade whatever is proscribed in ESMA regulations. 
 
Second, the result of baking a pizza is fully observable. By contrast, the actions of financial 
operators are only imperfectly observable. They need to be detected and then establish that 
those actions can indeed have a negative impact on financial stability. The latter may be 
further complicated by the fact that even if short selling has negative effects it may also 
have positive effects. Then it may be very difficult to measure their net effect. 
 
Both of these factors, combined with the difficulty of defining precise inputs [or, in the case 
of ESMA, behaviour that should be prohibited] and precise outputs [or, in the case of ESMA, 
desired market outcomes] make it particularly challenging to assign specific supervisory 
tasks to any entity, European or national. 
 
The economic theory on the principal-agent relationship has examined at length how agents 
can be motivated to produce results that benefit principals.2 The crux of the problem is that 
the principal can only imperfectly observe the actions of the agent. So the principal cannot 
be sure how much effort is exerted by the agent. The typical solution in the literature is to 
align the interests of the principal with those of the agent by allowing the agent to benefit 
from outcomes that are also valued by the principal [e.g. sharing of profits, granting 
bonuses according to revenue generated, etc]. 
 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Fudenberg, Drew, Bengt Holmstrom, and Paul Milgrom. "Short-term contracts and long-
term agency relationships." Journal of Economic Theory 51.1 (1990): 1-31; Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. 
Hart. "An analysis of the principal-agent problem." Econometrica (1983): 7-45; Hölmstrom, Bengt. "Moral 
hazard and observability." The Bell Journal of Economics (1979): 74-91; Nalebuff, Barry J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 
"Prizes and incentives: towards a general theory of compensation and competition." The Bell Journal of 
Economics (1983): 21-43; Sappington, David, “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 5.2 (1991): 45-66. 
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As already alluded above, the main difference between the standard principal-agent theory 
and the case of ESMA, apart from the fact that it has multiple principals, i.e. the European 
Commission and the Member States, is that none of the principals can define the desired 
outcome with any meaningful ex ante precision. Although it can be surmised that the 
outcome can be influenced by the amount of effort and ingenuity of ESMA, it is simply not 
known whether it is humanly possible for ESMA to eliminate all harmful short selling or by 
how much it can reduce it. So it is not easy either to establish effective monitoring of its 
activities or to devise incentive mechanisms for inducing ESMA to regulate better.3 The 
typical solution to this problem is to make the agency accountable in order to impel it to do 
the best it can. The next section considers the meaning and implications of accountability 
and the problem of ascertaining what it means to do one’s best. 
 
 
The nature of accountability 
 
There is a voluminous literature on accountability, mostly in the fields of political science, 
administrative science and law.4 With a few notable exceptions, economics has not paid 
much attention to this issue. There is no universal or established definition of accountability. 
But at least two aspects of it are widely recognised and analysed in the broader literature. 
 
The first aspect is that the agent has to report to a higher authority or principal. Through 
this reporting, the agent accounts for his decisions and actions. The second aspect is that 
the higher authority or principal can reward or censure the agent. The agent bears the 
consequences of acting improperly or insufficiently. 
 
Other aspects of accountability concern the extent of control exercised by the principal over 
the agent, such as prior authorisation of decisions before they are implemented, extent of 
reporting by the agent and the severity of sanctions that can be applied by the principal. 
 
It is also noted in the literature that certain forms of accountability may impinge on the 
degree of independence of the agent, which also affects the amount and quality of the 
effort exerted by the agent. By definition a principal assigns tasks to an agent because the 
principal cannot or does not want to carry them out himself. The agent, therefore, must be 
able to act without receiving further specific instructions from the principal to do so each 
time he acts. 
                                                          
3 We ignore here the possibility, which is very much real, that the principals may also have conflicting interests. 
4 See, for example, Biela, Jan and Yannis Papadopoulos, Strategies for Assessing and Measuring Agency 
Accountability, Paper for the 32nd EGPA Annual Conference 2010, 7-10 September 2010, Toulouse; Bovens, 
M. “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual framework” European Law Journal, 13.4 (2007): 447-
468; Maggetti, Martino, Karin Ingold and Frédéric Varone. “Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: Can Regulatory 





It is important to appreciate that an agent without some independence cannot be 
accountable in the sense of being responsible for his actions. If all of the decisions and 
actions of the agent are controlled by the principal, then the agent can only be considered 
as an extension of the principal, not as someone who can act autonomously or separately. 
An accountable agent must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy or independence. 
 
Independence is even more essential when agents need to use their own knowledge, 
experience, initiative and judgment to generate outcomes which cannot be defined ex ante 
and exhaustively by the principal. In these circumstances, granting the agent too little 
independence would defeat the purpose of assigning or delegating tasks to an agent. 
Attempting to control closely the actions of the agent [i.e. reducing the independence of the 
agent] would compromise the achievement of the end results. Therefore, accountability is a 
means for ensuring that independence is exercised properly, effectively or fruitfully, 
whenever such independence is necessary for achieving results which are ex ante unknown. 
It would appear that the more independent the agent, the more accountable he should be. 
But the unavoidable implication of conferring independence to the agent to act as he 
considers appropriate is that the principal must accept the consequences of the decisions 
and actions of the agent. 
 
While an accountable agent must be independent to perform whatever he is responsible  
for, the converse is not necessarily true. An independent agent is not necessarily 
accountable. Yet, a principal must make an independent agent accountable, otherwise he 
may do whatever he wants to do irrespective of the wishes of the principal. So it is in the 
interests of the principal that the agent is independent and at the same time accountable 
too. 
 
But there is a problem here. Certain forms of accountability which are too intrusive or are 
applied ex ante [e.g. requirement for prior and detailed notification and authorisation of 
intended action] may curtail the independence of the agent. Whether all forms of 
accountability necessarily reduce the independence of the agent is a contentious issue.5 
Some authors argue that they are inversely related, others contend that they are linked but 
not in a strict inverse relationship. Yet some others think that they are separate concepts.  
 
For sure the two concepts can be defined both as distinct and as inter-related. For the 
purposes of this paper, we understand independence to be a description of the universe of 
all possible actions/decisions, and accountability to be a determinant of the choice of 
specific actions within that universe. In other words, independence delineates boundaries 
and accountability leads to selection of particular actions within those boundaries. It is 
                                                          
5 See Scholten, Miroslava, Accountability vs. Independence: Proving the Negative Correlation, forthcoming, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2014, and references therein. 
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possible that certain accountability mechanisms or arrangements may restrict the universe 
of possible options and therefore end up curtailing the independence of the agent and vice 
versa. The “art” in the delegation of tasks is to find an arrangement whereby the agent is 
accountable without his independence being excessively curtailed. 
 
Over time, however, the principal learns from the results of the decisions and actions of the 
agent. That is, the actions of the agent reveal information about his ability to achieve what 
the principal wants. This means that the principal-agent relationship is dynamic and evolves 
over time. Both the principal and the agent will, of course, take the revealed information 
into account, the principal ex post and the agent ex ante. 
 
The next section uses a simple model to formalise the relationship between the principal 
and the agent in order to identify how an accountable agent is likely to behave and what is 
the best approach for the principal who can determine the boundaries of the agent’s 
independence and the accountability mechanisms to which the agent is subject and can 
take into account learning effects over time. 
 
 
A simple model of accountability and independence 
 
In the typical principal-agent formulation, there is a component of the agent’s work which is 
observable and a component which is not.6 For most principal-agent relationships the non-
observable component is the most important element that affects the outcomes produced 
by the agent. In the case of ESMA, this does not appear to be very significant because, given 
its regulatory function, it must make public all the rules it devises and enforces. Moreover, 
as explained later on, ESMA has to consult its principals before it acts. Hence, there is no 
major problem in observing ESMA’s actions. However, there is still a problem in motivating 
ESMA to be innovative and devise rules that can prove effective in pre-empting and 
remedying market malfunctions. Consultation can prevent ESMA from acting, but cannot 
force it to act and, for sure, it can hardly make it more innovative. Since in designing and 
enforcing financial regulation pre-emption is important, inaction [i.e. under-regulation] can 
be as problematic as excessive action [i.e. over-regulation]. In addition, and perhaps more 
importantly, outsiders do not observe the internal costs of ESMA. These are not the 
accounting costs of ESMA’s functions, which are probably well-known to its principals. 
Rather they are the costs associated with effort, managerial supervision, staff motivation, 
etc. Certainly, these internal costs exist in all organisations, also for ESMA and they do have 
an impact on ESMA’s performance. We consider their impact immediately below. 
 
                                                          
6 There is also a component that is neither observable, nor definable ex ante. This component is made up by 
the internal characteristics of the agent such as ingenuity, intelligence, tenacity, etc. They very much influence 
the final outcome but cannot be meaningfully measured. 
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We assume that ESMA is a rational agent that wants to minimise the costs it bears from its 
operations. This is its objective function. Let’s indicate the costs borne by ESMA by its own 
actions as C. C is a function of x which is a measure of the regulatory effort of ESMA; i.e. C = 
ƒ(x). Further assume that because some effort is both observable and measureable, it can be 
fixed in advance so that the agent is forced to exert a certain minimum effort. The function 
C becomes then C = ƒ(e’ + x)  where e’ is the minimum required effort and x is extra effort. In 
Figure 1, function C is simplified by assuming that it takes the form C = β(e’ + x) [a straight 
line]. The horizontal axis starts at e’. 
 
The ideal situation for the principal is when the agent exerts as much effort as necessary to 
reach the best possible outcome. Since in the case of ESMA the desired outcome is defined 
only in terms of general policy targets, the principal focuses on the effort exerted by ESMA. 
In general, the more effort exerted by ESMA the better. As explained later on, the regulation 
that establishes ESMA and the regulation on short selling impose on it certain obligations to 
regulate or, in our terms, to act. This can be thought of as one of the accountability 
mechanisms that apply to ESMA. 
 
Let’s assume that the principals of ESMA define the accountability mechanism in a way that 
reflects the gains to society from ESMA’s regulations. We can think of it as corresponding to 
the social opportunity cost from ESMA inaction. Therefore, if ESMA does not exert 
additional effort, social costs are high, but as ESMA acts, costs decline. We can now consider 
how this impacts on ESMA. The accountability mechanism can reasonably be presumed to 
be designed in such a way so that it also creates costs for ESMA [i.e. inaction is costly for 
ESMA].  
 
If the opportunity cost of society is given by a function A, then we can surmise that the 
accountability mechanism is such that a proportion of A, i.e. αA, reflects the costs borne by 
ESMA. It is assumed that A is convex so that dA/dx < 0 and that d2A/dx2 > 0. That is, as ESMA 
exerts more effort, the costs of these obligations decline but at a decreasing rate. 
Obligations imposed on ESMA make it accountable because it is costly for it not to fulfil 
them. Although inaction is costly, excessive action is costly too because after a point [shown 
by x” in Figure 1], function A curves upwards. Since we already assume that the principals do 
not have a perfect accountability mechanism (at this point dA/dx =0) , the costs [which are a 
proportion of the opportunity cost of society] do not decline to zero. The principals are 
never sure that ESMA action resolves all market problems or that it is even theoretically 
possible for ESMA to resolve all problems [so they always face some opportunity cost]. For 
the principals there are two distinct sources of information: the market and ESMA. The 
problem is that the information is mixed up. 
 
The objective of ESMA is to find an x such that it minimises the total cost, T, of effort and 
accountability. That is, it minimises T(C, A) = C(x) + A(x). The optimum x for ESMA is at x* 
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where dC/dx = – dA/dx. This is shown in Figure 1 where x* is at the point where total cost T 
is at its lowest level. It is important to note is that if functions C and A have linear and 
convex shapes, respectively, then there will always exist a minimum. ESMA will not want to 
move beyond x*, nor will it want to stay below x*. 
 
Incidentally, it is worth noting at that point that a regulator in the situation described here 
would experience economies of scale because for certain values of x, function T is 
downward-sloping. More formally, if we raise respectively the cost of ESMA own actions 
and the opportunity cost for the society by a constant term γ, the resulting total cost 
function satisfies the inequality T(γC, γA) < γC(x) + γA(x). 
 
These economies of scale also suggest that a single regulatory authority is a more efficient 
arrangement, ceteris paribus, than a system with multiple authorities [of course, there is 
also the problem that a system with multiple authorities and overlapping jurisdictions would 
create confusion and enforcement conflicts]. On the other hand, the existence of multiple 
authorities allows their principals to compare their performance. In our model we do not 
formally analyse interaction between multiple regulators. However, we will return to this 
issue in the section where we assess the ESMA judgment. 
 
To summarise so far, our simple model shows that it is the accountability mechanism that 
induces the agent to act, not the extent of his independence. Limiting independence, limits 
the options of the agent but does not incentivise the agent either to exert more effort or to 
choose any particular option. If the above simple reasoning holds, then ESMA has a strong 
incentive to be active in devising and enforcing regulations. Accountability mechanisms that 
penalise inaction do indeed induce ESMA to regulate. In practice, the essential question is 
whether the regulations that are certain to come out of ESMA are such that they can 
achieve the objective of preventing and remedying market failure. 
 
In the next section we explore in more detail the interaction between the principal and 
agent over time, as they may take into account learning effects and then we consider the 





As shown in the previous section, there is a natural tendency for an accountable agent to 
act. Therefore, the principal should worry more about binding constraints on the 





For whatever accountability mechanism that is used, the agent must have sufficient 
independence to exercise additional effort. If the constraints on the independence of the 
agent prevent him from reaching x* then they are binding. If they become binding only for a 
value of x such that x > x*, then they are not binding because the agent would never 
voluntarily exert effort larger than x*. This means that the natural tendency of the agent to 
be active, but not excessively active, implies that the principal should be concerned about 
the negative impact of too little independence rather than too much independence [for 
whatever accountability mechanisms that are imposed]. 
 
Figure 1 also shows a boundary at x^ imposed by the principal on the actions of the agent. 
The boundary is never reached by the agent because x* < x^. In this model, boundaries are 
not effective in inducing the agent to get closer to x” [which is the value such that d(αA)/dx 
=0 and it is the optimum of the principal because it minimises society’s costs from market 
instability]. 
 
If the boundary that is shown in Figure 1 is an upper boundary, one may think that the 
solution is to impose a lower boundary to force the agent to move to the right. But if 
accountability mechanisms apply only within the limits of the boundaries of the agent [i.e. 
the extent of the agent’s independence] and if they have the shape that is postulated here, 
it is likely that x* and x” will get closer to each other, but will not coincide. After all, Figure 1 
also has a lower boundary. It is the vertical axis at e’. 
 
Figure 1 can help us gain some insight into the nature of the trade-off between the 
independence of the agent and his accountability. By compressing the lower and upper 
boundaries and by limiting the distance between them, the optimum of the agent, x*, gets 
closer to the optimum of the principal, x”. But this assumes that the principal has a pretty 
good idea of the value of optimum action by the agent. If he does not, then he risks limiting 
the options of the agent to a range of x that may be far from the real x”. If the principal does 
not have the prerequisite prior knowledge, the boundaries must be wider apart, which also 
increases the distance between x* and x”. Ex ante ignorance entails that many possible 
values of x are admissible. 
 
Now, let’s inject a bit of complexity. The section on the nature of accountability was 
concluded with the suggestion that both the principal and the agent learn over time. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that the principal would expect the agent to internalise 
these learning effects. An accountable agent must be an agent who is capable of learning 
and adjusting, but non-adjusting agent must also be accountable . Indeed accountability can 
be thought to imply that the agent has to justify why he chooses to ignore important 




But this creates a problem for the agent in the following sense. Assume that the principal 
and the agent interact in two periods, 1 and 2. Figure 2 shows two sets of functions, T and A, 
for period 1 in solid lines and for period 2 in intermittent lines. It also shows a lower 
boundary of x, at x~. If in period 1, x~ is exceeded then in period 2, the principal pushes the 
A function to the right because he expects more effort from the agent. It is as if the principal 
pushes the lower boundary from e’ to x~. If the agent minimises his costs in period 2, the 
optimum effort is given by x2*. But T2 at x2* is higher than T1 at x1*. Therefore, the agent has 
a strong incentive not to minimise costs in period 1 because x1* exceeds the threshold value 
of x~. Therefore, he wilfully underperforms and stays at x1 in order not to give a signal to the 
principal by exceeding x~. 
 
We now have to adjust our previous conclusions. If there is no learning then ESMA will 
actively regulate. However, in a dynamic context where learning occurs, ESMA may have an 
incentive to underperform so as to jam the signals to the principal. 
 
The principals of ESMA, like any principal who interacts inter-temporally with an agent, have 
to devise ways of assessing the performance of ESMA, not simply by observing the outcome 
of its actions but, in addition, by forming expectations as to its future performance and 
outcomes. 
 
There are several ways they can form expectations about future performance. They can 
predict performance on the basis of theoretical models. This is akin to asking how another 
agent or a typical agent would act in the same situation. Or they can empirically observe 
what other agents actually do in similar situations. Both the theoretical and empirical 
method in fact establish a benchmark of what can be reasonably expected. But whatever 
they choose to do, there are consequences for both the principal, who has to exert more 
effort in control activities, and the agent, who has to work harder. 
  
This situation can be modelled as a game where two players, a principal and an agent, may 
respectively choose to control or trust and to work or shirk. This can be shown in terms of 
payoff values expressing the return for ESMA and the EU. Let’s assume the following payoffs 
which take into account possible accountability mechanisms: 
 
For ESMA: +2 if it works hard without being controlled by the EU; +1 if it works hard but 
under the control of the EU; +3 if it shirks without being controlled and -1 if it shirks but it is 
controlled by the EU. 
 
For the EU: +3 if ESMA works hard without having to control it; and +2 if ESMA works hard 
but only when the EU controls it; -2 if ESMA shirks without any control and -1 if ESMA shirks 












W 2,3 1,2 
S 3,-2 -1,-1 
 
 
With these payoffs, there is no dominant strategy that can form a Nash equilibrium. If the 
EU trusts, then ESMA will choose to shirk. If the EU controls, ESMA will work. The same 
applies to the EU. If ESMA works, the EU will trust it. If it shirks, the EU will control it. 
 
However, we can determine the probability p of trusting and controlling that can generate 
the same payoff for the principal (i.e. the EU). This results from equalising the payoffs from 
choices T and C to have the same expected returns from trusting ESMA actions or from 
deciding to check the outcome produced, i.e. 
 3𝑝 − 2(1− 𝑝) = 2𝑝 − (1− 𝑝) => 𝑝𝐸𝑈 =  12 
 
Therefore, in a context where the principal and the agent learn over time from past actions, 
if the EU succeeds to convince ESMA that there is a 50% chance of being checked for its 
behaviour, this will result in the same welfare gain irrespective of whether the EU actually 
decides to exercise its control or not.  
 
Indeed, if we consider the probability q of working or shirking that can generate the same 
payoff for the agent, then 
 2𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞) = 3𝑞 − (1 − 𝑞) => 𝑞𝐸𝑆𝑀𝐴 =  23 
 
The agent is more likely to work. 
 
This result shows that we can design an institutional framework in which the EU can allow 
the agent to accomplish its duties independently, as long as the agent credibly considers the 





More generally, we can also see this as a coordination game in which the parties can realise 
gains by making mutually consistent decisions over not only the type of actions but also the 
two minimum levels of effort x (generic) and x~. In this case both the principal and the agent 
obtain joint benefits in, respectively, trusting and exerting high level of effort at the same 
time. 
 








W 1,1 0,0 
S 0,0 x, x~ 
 
With 0 < x~ < x < 1. 
 
 
In Table 2 we see that neither the principal, nor the agent derive any gain from having non-
coordinated decisions. Both of them bear the burden from lack of coordination. If the agent 
chooses to work and the principal to control, since the agent carries out his duties, the 
principal wastes resources in checking the agent. The agent also suffers a loss because of 
the control exerted by the principal over his actions. If the principal chooses to trust and the 
agent to work or the agent shirks and the principal controls, then in the first case they 
obtain the highest payoffs [they are assumed to be equal for both players] while in the 
second case the payoffs are equal to the two minimum thresholds of effort x and x~. This 
outcome is undesirable because payoffs are lower than in the case where the principal and 
the agent avoid waste of resources by coordinating their behaviour. 
 
In a static coordination game where both the principal and the agent take decisions at the 
same time having all possible information about the other player’s payoffs - with the highest 
payoffs occurring when they choose the same strategy - there are two possible equilibria. 
One would be characterised by the choice of working for the agent (W) and trusting for the 
principal (T), and the other by the choice of shirking (S) and controlling (C). However in a 
static framework we are not able to say which one is more likely to occur. Nevertheless we 
can consider a dynamic framework to show what would happen where both the principal 




Considering the pairs of choices working v trusting and shirking v controlling , it is  possible 
to determine the probability such that both the EU and ESMA have the same expected gain 
irrespectively of which pair is actually chosen. This can happen in relation to the probability 
of being indifferent in terms of pay-off between their choices.  
 
Starting from the agent and assuming both his choices as equally likely to happen, these 
have to be both best responses to the principal’s probabilities of trusting and controlling, 
respectively p and 1 – p, in order to make the agent indifferent between working and 
shirking.  The same applies to the principal in terms of the probability q that the agent is 
willing to commit himself to work. 
 
More formally this will be such that – for the agent –  the expected payoffs of working and 
shirking in terms of the probabilities (p and 1 – p) of trusting and controlling are equalised. 
For the principal instead this will be in terms of the agent’s probabilities of working and 
shirking (q and 1 – q) , i.e. 
 
ESMA:  𝑝 = (1− 𝑝) 𝑥 
and 
EU:   𝑞 = (1− 𝑞) 𝑥~ 
 
Which lead to the equilibrium probabilities : 
 
 
𝑝𝐸𝑈  = 𝑥1+𝑥    and  𝑞𝐸𝑆𝑀𝐴  = 𝑥~1+𝑥~ 
 
 
These reflect how likely the agent and the principals are to be indifferent between their 
choices. More specifically this means that in order to make the principal indifferent between 
controlling and trusting, ESMA will have to choose to work with a probability 𝑞 = 𝑥~
1+𝑥~ and 
conversely to shirk with 1 − 𝑞 = 1 − 𝑥~
1+𝑥~ =  11+𝑥~. ESMA instead will be indifferent 
between working and shirking if the principal chooses to trust with a probability 𝑝 = 𝑥
1+𝑥
    
and to control for 1 − 𝑝 = 1 − 𝑥
1+𝑥
   =  1
1+𝑥










This can represented using Table 2 as follows: 
 
 
   𝑝 1− 𝑝 
   𝑥1 + 𝑥   11 + 𝑥   
  EU 
ESMA  
T C 
𝑞 𝑥~1 + 𝑥~ W 1,1 0,0 1− 𝑞 11 + 𝑥~ S 0,0 x, x~ 
 
 
It is interesting to note that in this case a larger minimum level of effort, x and x~, does not 
result in a larger probability of the agent to choose to shirk, and for the principal to control. 
Conversely, this would simply denote a change in the probability of being indifferent 
between the two actions. This means that, again, enforcing a certain (higher) level of effort 
by the agent does not necessarily produce better results, particularly considering the 
(higher) cost borne by both parties for this enforcement. An increase in the minimum 
threshold of required effort might indeed simply cause the agent to strictly commit to this 
minimum level refusing to perform any better, in turn lowering dramatically any chances for 
the principal to observe an effort above the threshold. This is also because increasing the 
minimum level of effort demanded will only increase the indifference between the pairs of 
choices, without really affecting the likelihood of any of them to occur. 
 
This situation is represented graphically in Figure 3 where the ESMA best response functions 
for the two choices (W, S) and (T, C) are shown in terms of the probability p and q of 
realising the same gains in both cases. In the first sequence of graphs this is done for the 
agent on the left hand side in terms of the utility resulting from the level of effort x and the 
probability p and 1 – p associated to the principal’s choices (T, C). This results into the best 
responses representing the agent strategies that produce the highest payoff given what the 
principal is doing. The intersection of the two best response functions gives the Nash 
equilibrium of this game where nobody can receive a greater pay-off from changing actions 
(i.e. deviating unilaterally), assuming the other player maintains his strategy.  
 
Looking at the agent’s utility in choosing to work when the principal might decide to trust 
his actions with a probability p, the expected payoff is simply equal to this very same 
probability, i.e. u(W, p) = p. On the other hand the expected payoffs associated to the 
agent’s choice of shirking results into a utility level u(S, p) = (1 – p) x. In this latter case if the 
principal chooses to trust with a probability p equal to zero this delivers a payoff equal to x 
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(with 0 < x < 1) , whereas if p instead equals 1 then the level of effort as well as the 
associated payoff becomes null. 
The graph on the right hand side repeats the same analysis for the principal’s choices (T, C) 
this time considering the minimum level of effort desired x~ and the probabilities q and 1 – 
q associated to the agent’s choices (W, S).  In this case everything is analogous to the 
previous one, just the intersection of the two curves happens earlier along the horizontal 
axis since x~ < x.  
The second series of graphs instead simply maps this situation in terms of the probabilities p 
and q associated respectively to the choices (W, S) and (T, C). This is done looking at the best 
responses for both choices represented in the previous graphs. Considering the agent’s 
utility for (W, S) we can see as the choice of shirking delivers a higher outcome for a 
probability 0 < 𝑝𝑆 < x/x+1. On the other hand working is better for 𝑝𝑊 > x/x+1, whereas the 
agent is indifferent in terms of the two choices if 𝑝𝑊 = 𝑝𝑆 = x/x+1. The same logic applies to 
the principal’s utility resulting from the pair of choices (T, C). 
Furthermore, it is also possible to introduce an incentive mechanism to induce both the 
agent and the principal to coordinate their choices over the decision of respectively working 
and trusting. For this to happen it’s enough to increase either the payoff of ESMA in case he 
commits to work and the principal runs a check over his actions or the one of the principal in 
the unhappy case where he trusts the agent and the latter chooses to shirk – as if a 
compensation for the agent’s inefficiency was introduced.  
 








W 1, 1 x, 0 
S 0, x x, x~ 
 
 
From Table 3 we can see as now the principal’s probability of trusting that could induce 
ESMA to prefer to commit to a high level of effort is such that it makes the expected gain 
from working greater than the one from shirking, i.e. 
 




So to have: 
𝑝 > 0 
 
Hence the simple introduction of an incentive for the agent to commit even when the 
principal checks his action is enough to motivate him to perform at its best. Indeed for the 
principal is now sufficient to be even slightly likely  to trust (in fact whatever p > 0 is enough) 
to have the agent willing to provide high levels of effort rather than shirking. As said before 
an analogous result could then be showed in terms of the agent’s probability q that could 
induce the principal to be more in favour of trusting rather than controlling, provided that a 
compensation for the agent’s inefficiency is offered in case the latter chooses to be 
unproductive. 
 
Therefore, in order to achieve a better outcome with reduced costs, it is not enough for the 
principal to implement a credible and effective accountability mechanism. He also needs to 
resist the temptation of adapting it too often or making it too strict because this would, on 
the one hand, raise the costs connected to the regulatory process and, on the other, he 
reduce the value of the outcome delivered by the agent. The latter in fact needs to be 
granted some independence to exert effort higher than the minimum requirements to 
perform its standard tasks. It is also necessary to have a framework where both the principal 
and the agent can learn from their past actions to finally arrive at a stable equilibrium where 
as a result of a dynamic process, the decisions of both sides converge towards the welfare 
maximising choices for the whole society. 
 
Before turning to the actual ESMA judgment, it is useful to summarise the main points of 
the analysis so far. They are as follows: 
 
i) If the results that are desired by the principal cannot be fully described ex ante, then the 
agent needs to enjoy a certain degree of independence. 
ii) In order to ensure that independence is not abused, the agent also needs to be 
accountable. 
iii) There is a trade-off between independence and accountability in the sense that 
constraining the choices of the agent also make him accountable/responsible for fewer 
possible outcomes. 
iv) The principal should be concerned about the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms. 
v) The agent has an incentive to be active but will not try very hard, if he incurs costs. In a 
dynamic setting the agent may wilfully underperform so as to jam signals to the principal. 
vi) The principal needs to have a benchmark to assess the actual performance of the agent. 
The benchmark is the expected performance of a typical agent, if such an agent can be 
identified theoretically or empirically. 
vii) Under conditions of imperfect information about desired market outcomes and about 
the true ability of the agent, accountability in the form of ex post assessment of 
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performance is probably more effective than in the form of ex ante control of the agent’s 
choices. 
viii) Any form of control by the principal is costly for both the principal and the agent. It is in 
their long-term interest to cooperate whereby there is neither excessive control, nor 
shirking. 
ix) It follows that the control by the principal and the accountability of the agent are 
activities that evolve over time. 
 
 
The ESMA case 
 
On 22 January 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union rendered its judgment in 
case C-270/12 concerning an action for annulment brought by the UK against the European 
Parliament and the Council of the EU.7 
 
The UK sought annulment of Article 28 of Regulation 236/2012 on short selling and certain 
aspects of credit default swaps8. This Article confers on the European Securities and 
Markets Authority [ESMA] certain powers which, according to the UK, contravened the 
“Meroni doctrine”. Regulation 236/2012 itself was adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU 
for approximation of laws necessary for the functioning of the internal market. 
 
Under Article 28 of Regulation 236/2012 ESMA may i) require natural or legal persons who 
have short positions in relation to a specific financial instrument to notify a competent 
authority or disclose details of any such position; or ii) prohibit a short sale which relates to 
a different financial instrument where a financial advantage is obtained in the event of a 
decrease in the price of another financial instrument. 
 
Furthermore, ESMA may act only if i) there is a threat to the orderly functioning and 
integrity of financial markets or to the stability of the financial system and ii) no competent 
authority has taken measures to address the threat. 
 
Article 28 also requires ESMA to take into account the extent to which its measures i) 
significantly address the threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets 
and the stability of the financial system, ii) create a risk of regulatory arbitrage, iii) have a 
detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets. 
 
                                                          
7 The actual text of the judgment can be accessed at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=146621&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54936 
8 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short 
selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps OJ L86, 2012 
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Before deciding to impose or renew any measure, ESMA must i) consult the European 
Systemic Risk Board [ESRB], ii) notify the competent authorities concerned. The notification 
must include evidence supporting the reasons for those measures. 
 
Lastly, ESMA must review its measures at appropriate intervals and at least every 3 months. 
If a measure is not renewed by the end of a three-month period, it automatically expires.  
 
Subsequently, the Commission in Delegated Regulation 918/2012 defined in more detailed 
the circumstances in which ESMA could decide to take action. Furthermore, in 
Implementing Regulation 827/2012, the Commission laid down technical standards with 





The UK claimed that there was a breach of the principles relating to the delegation of 
powers, as laid down in case 9/56, Meroni v High Authority9, because ESMA had “a very 
large measure of discretion”. More specifically, it thought that whether there was a “threat” 
to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets, or to the stability of the 
financial system was a “highly subjective judgment” which would lead ESMA in the 
“implementation of actual economic policy and require it to arbitrate between conflicting 
public interests, make value judgments and carry out complex economic assessments.” In 
addition, ESMA had “extremely wide-ranging discretion when deciding how to take account 
of the factors set out in Article 28”. 10 Such decisions would be “highly subjective”, would 
“require an analysis of the significant economic policy implications” and would result in 
“unquantifiable judgments”. [paragraphs 28-34 of the judgment] 
 
The Court began its assessment of the main plea alleging breach of the Meroni doctrine by 
identifying the relevant issues of the Meroni case. “The consequences resulting from a 
delegation of powers are very different depending on whether it involves clearly defined 
executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light 
of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority, or whether it involves a 
‘discretionary power implying a wide margin of discretion which may, according to the use 
which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy’. [paragraph 41] 
 
“A delegation of the first kind cannot appreciably alter the consequences involved in the 
exercise of the powers concerned, whereas a delegation of the second kind, since it replaces 
                                                          
9 Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche v. High Authority, [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
10 For more on decision-making powers by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: E. M. Busuioc, 
M., Rulemaking by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope, (2013) European Law 




the choices of the delegator by the choices of the delegate, brings about an ‘actual transfer 
of responsibility’. As regards the case which gave rise to Meroni v High Authority, the Court 
held that the powers delegated by the High Authority to the bodies in question … gave 
those bodies ‘a degree of latitude which implied a wide margin of discretion’, which could 
not be considered compatible with the ‘requirements of the Treaty’.” [paragraph 42] 
 
In other words, the exercise of a wide margin of discretion by the bodies to which powers 
are delegated is incompatible with EU law. 
 
Then the Court turned its attention to the functioning of ESMA. It noted “that Article 28 
does not confer any autonomous power on that entity that goes beyond the bounds of the 
regulatory framework established by the ESMA Regulation.” [paragraph 44] 
  
It went on to observe that “unlike the case of the powers delegated to the bodies concerned 
in Meroni v High Authority, the exercise of the powers under Article 28 of Regulation 
No 236/2012 is circumscribed by various conditions and criteria which limit ESMA’s 
discretion.” [paragraph 45] 
 
It listed the following constraints on ESMA’s discretion [paragraphs 46-50]: 
 
1. ESMA can adopt measures only if they address a threat to the orderly functioning and 
integrity of financial markets or to the stability of the financial system in the Union and 
there are cross-border implications. 
 
2. All ESMA measures are subject to the condition that no competent national authority 
has taken measures to address the threat. 
 
3. ESMA is required to take into account the extent to which a measure i) significantly 
addresses the threat to the orderly functioning of financial markets or to the stability of 
the financial system, ii) does not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage and iii) does not 
have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets. 
 
4. ESMA is required to consult the ESRB and must notify the competent national 
authorities concerned of the measure it proposes to take, including evidence supporting 
the reasons why it must be adopted. 
 
5. ESMA is also required to review the measure at appropriate intervals. 
 
The Court concluded that ESMA’s “margin of discretion was circumscribed” by both the 
consultation requirement and the temporary nature of the measures authorised, which 
were “established on the basis of best current practice in the field of supervision” 
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[paragraph 50]. It is not clear how the Court reached the conclusion that ESMA relied on 
“best current practice”. At any rate, the Court also considered that there was a “detailed 
delineation of the powers of intervention available to ESMA”. [paragraph 51] 
 
On the basis of the above reasoning, the Court found that ESMA’s powers were in 
compliance with the Meroni doctrine and that “those powers do not, therefore, imply that 
ESMA is vested with a ‘very large measure of discretion’ that is incompatible with the FEU 
Treaty”. [paragraph 54] That is, having powers is not equivalent to having discretion, as long 
as, according to the Court, the powers are precisely delineated. 
 
There were several other pleas all of which were rejected by the Court leading it to dismiss 
in its entirety the UK action. 
 
 
Assessment of the ESMA judgment 
 
When seen within the confines of the particular circumstances of ESMA, the judgment11 is 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. It is evolutionary in the sense that the Court has 
recognised explicitly, most probably for the first time, that an agency that wields significant 
powers does not necessarily enjoy a wide margin of discretion. This is because it may be 
possible for the principal, i.e. the EU, to delineate the powers it delegates to it so that they 
leave little room for discretionary action by the agency12. 
 
The question that arises is, of course, whether the powers of ESMA are indeed sufficiently 
delineated so that its discretion is actually curtailed. In answering this question, we need to 
start from one of the conclusions of the Court of Justice which in paragraph 116 of its 
judgment acknowledged that “the purpose of the powers provided for in Article 28 of 
Regulation No 236/2012 is in fact to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market in the financial field.” Since ESMA had been assigned such 
a broad responsibility, then we can put forth the following arguments with regard to the 
judgment. 
 
First, as shown by the theoretical analysis in previous sections, the problem is not inaction, 
since the presence of effective accountability mechanisms suffice to push the agent towards 
a minimum level of effort every time. Therefore, the fact that ESMA is required to consult 
will not curb its natural tendency as an agent to act. Since it would want to act, it would also 
consult. ESMA apparently is not prevented from acting when it receives negative advice at 
consultations. 
                                                          
11 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, [2014]. 
12 For more on the delegation of powers to the agencies: Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmström. “The theory of 




Second, as also concluded in the theoretical discussion, the challenge for the principal is not 
to impose too many constraints on the agent. Rather the principal should want to confer 
wide discretion but at the same time subject the agent to effective accountability, which is 
possible as long as the right incentives are employed. As pointed out before, it is neither 
realistic, nor rational to expect ESMA to resolve all market problems which formally come 
under its purview, given the existence of opportunity costs and incentive constraints.  
Perhaps no authority would be willing to give a negative advice for fear that it may be 
blamed in case market conditions deteriorate.  
 
Third, apart from the broad obligation of ESMA to justify its actions, and show that they are 
intended to remedy market failure, and its obligation to consult nothing else appears to 
limit the substance of its decisions. So its powers may not be effectively circumscribed. 
Given that neither perfect accountability, nor effort maximisation are realistically 
achievable,  the EU must be forward looking and take into account the dynamic nature of 
the principal-agent relationship. This suggests that in the case of agencies such as ESMA, ex-
post assessment of their performance is as necessary as ex ante obligations. 
 
There are also other aspects of the judgment that detract from its quality. First, the Court 
mixes up the limits on ESMA’s discretion, what ESMA is allowed to do and how long it is 
allowed to do it [i.e. the extent of its independence] with how ESMA is required to consult, 
explain and justify its decisions and the measures it adopts. [i.e. the extent of its 
accountability].  
 
Second, the Court does not consider, and indeed appears to be unaware, that effective 
exercise of the powers to safeguard the stability and integrity of the financial system 
necessarily implies that ESMA must enjoy a degree of independence that cannot be fully 
circumscribed in advance. It is simply impossible to draw up an exhaustive list of the threats 
to the stability and integrity of the financial system and the corresponding remedial action 
that should be undertaken in each eventuality by ESMA. The UK is right that ESMA will have 
to make subjective and judgmental calls. Therefore, for ESMA’s principals the question is 
whether they have effective means to evaluate the quality of those judgment calls. 
 
Third, the Court does not consider at all whether the accountability mechanisms to which 
ESMA is subject are sufficient to curtail its margin of discretion. If, as the UK claims, ESMA 
will have to carry out complex economic analysis, how will the EU, the ESRB, and the 
Member States be able to contend that ESMA has breached its powers? This is the issue 
mentioned above about evaluating judgmental calls. 
 
Fourth, too little regulation is as much a problem as excessive regulation. In other words, 
the Court does not examine whether ESMA may in fact abuse its margin of discretion by not 
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being active enough. This would mean that ESMA would not regulate and therefore it would 
not need to consult. But inaction is also a problem [because it does not remedy market 
failure] and Member States need to have other ways of assessing whether ESMA acts 
correctly by not intervening. 
 
Fifth, and more broadly, the motivation behind the independent regulators that have been 
established across industrial countries during the past two decades is to concentrate 
technical tasks in single, sector-specific authorities so that the quality of their decisions 
improves with experience while at the same time insulating them from political 
intervention. Indeed, the financial crisis has shown that when markets move erratically, 
regulators need to act not only fast, but also decisively, in unusual and innovative ways and 
without heeding much attention to the transient concerns of the government of the day. As 
argued at several points in this paper, it defeats the purpose of delegating policy or 
enforcement responsibility to specialised agencies if their discretion is subsequently 
circumscribed through too many external controls. This clearly raises the need for different 
measures which can also be implemented at a lower cost. As it has also been shown, it is 
possible to design a framework where both the agent and the principal find it beneficial to 
cooperate over time.  
 
The Court of Justice does not seem to recognise that the Meroni doctrine has become 
obsolete as far as delegation of regulatory tasks in financial markets is concerned. 13 Of 
course the judgments of the Court always depend on the issues raised by the various parties 
and the arguments in law that they make. The Court cannot normally deal with issues not 
raised by the parties. 
 
However, it could have examined whether ESMA had to enjoy a certain degree of discretion 
in order to carry out effectively the tasks assigned to it. The Court could have also assessed 
the quality of the accountability mechanisms to which ESMA is subject and how Member 
States could evaluate the soundness of ESMA’s decisions and regulations. 14 They would 
afford the agent sufficient independence since they would not impede his actions before or 
during the regulatory process, but they would also ensure that the agent remains 






                                                          
13 J. Pelkmans and M. Simoncini, Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA can help build the single market, CEPS 
Commentary, 18 February 2014, argue that argue that Meroni has to be relaxed in relation not just to financial 
markets but all network industries. 
14 For more on the relations between the agencies and EU Member States: M. Everson, C. Monda, E. Vos, EU 





This paper has reviewed the recent judgment concerning ESMA in the context of the 
principal-agent theory. In this context the degree of accountability and the extent of 
independence of the agent have a decisive influence on the behaviour of the agent. 
 
Because financial regulation is not like baking pizza, regulators must necessarily enjoy a 
certain degree of independence which, however, has to be counterbalanced by 
accountability mechanisms such as an obligation to explain and justify regulatory measures.  
 
The ESMA judgment does not appear to recognise the need for regulators to be able to act 
with at least some independence and to wield at least some discretion. 
 
Moreover, the judgment does not examine in any detail whether and how the principals, i.e. 
the EU and Member States, are best able to evaluate the quality of ESMA decisions and 
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